Re: Space Shuttle Challenger, Part 1

After reading three of the four articles for this week, I find that I'm very sympathetic to the difficulties experienced by the engineers who discovered the potential for disaster before the Space Shuttle Challenger explosion. As a professional communicator, I have often run into similar political and "turf" issues on the job. Some of the most frustrating problems I have encountered are senior leadership's expectations (1) that I write what I'm asked to write, regardless of whether it represents the facts honestly or needs a certain "spin" put on it (even when doing so goes against my better judgment); and (2) that I will solve whatever problems arise without requiring help or guidance from senior leadership, and thus always be able to tell them what they want to hear.

I believe these are similar to the issues that were faced by the Morton Thiokol engineers when they tried to warn management of the potential danger of launching the shuttle on a cold day. To be fair, I understand the pressure that management was under: Morton Thiokol was a contractor doing their best to meet the expectations of their client with regard to timing and cost, but they allowed their "management hats" to influence their decision to launch, and it turns out that they -- and many others -- paid a great price for it.